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Moreover, giving some degree of weight to a local school boards knowledge, expertise, and concerns in these particular matters is not inconsistent with rigorous judicial scrutiny. Both cities once tried to achieve more integrated schools by relying solely upon measures such as redrawn district boundaries, new school building construction, and unrestricted voluntary transfers. Again, though, the school boards have no say in deciding whether an interest is compelling. App. The majority acknowledges that in prior cases this Court has recognized at least two interests as compelling: an interest in remedying the effects of past intentional discrimination, and an interest in diversity in higher education. Ante, at 12, 13. Nor does any precedent indicate, as the plurality suggests with respect to Louisville, ante, at 29, that remedial interests vanish the day after a federal court declares that a district is unitary. Of course, Louisville adopted those portions of the plan at issue here before a court declared Louisville unitary. Moreover, in Freeman, this Court pointed out that in one sense of the term, vestiges of past segregation by state decree do remain in our society and in our schools. at 315 (opinion of Powell, J. The Bible would be known in the legal community as the first Mr. Justice Harlans dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 552 (1896). Louisvilles plan was created and initially adopted when a compulsory district court order was in place. However, Seattle did not have a history of racially segregated schools. See post, at 37. Several of these cases were significantly more restrictive than Swann in respect to the degree of leniency the Fourteenth Amendment grants to programs designed to include people of all races. It was from this decision that the Parents Involved in Community Schools applied for writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. PICS also argues that the lower courts neglected to apply the correct strict scrutiny standard and instead gave undo deference to the school board. See Brief for Petitioner at 26. The Ninth Circuit asked whether the Seattle school districts particular use of race in its admission process violated the state constitution. Another brief claims that school desegregation has a modest positive impact on the achievement of African-American students. App. Indeed, if there is no such plan, or if such plans are purely imagined, it is understandable why, as the plurality notes, ante, at 27, Seattle school officials concentrated on diminishing the racial component of their districts plan, but did not pursue eliminating that element entirely. 1, 426 F. 3d 1162, 1177 (9th Cir. This working backward to achieve a particular type of racial balance, rather than working forward from some demonstration of the level of diversity that provides the purported benefits, is a fatal flaw under our existing precedent. Extending Grutter to this context would require us to cut that holding loose from its theoretical moorings. Reg. One can attempt to identify a construction of Jefferson Countys student assignment plan that, at least as a logical matter, complies with these competing propositions; but this does not remedy the underlying problem. From Swann to Grutter, this Courts decisions have emphasized this distinction, recognizing that the fate of race relations in this country depends upon unity among our children, for unless our children begin to learn together, there is little hope that our people will ever learn to live together. Milliken, 418 U. S., at 783 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. Opposition to Writ of Certiorari at 20; Brief for Respondent at 16. In 2003, the petitioner now before us, Crystal Meredith, brought this lawsuit challenging the plans unmodified portions, i.e., those portions that dealt with ordinary, not magnet, schools. KORRELL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER MR. KORRELL: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. For one thing, consider the effect of the pluralitys views on the parties before us and on similar school districts throughout the Nation. Justice Thomas concludes noting "If our history has taught us anything it has taught us to beware of elites bearing racial theories." certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit, No. Parents of school children sued the Seattle School Districts after their children were assigned to particular schools based on racial classifications to achieve integration in the school system. 663, 664 (1962) (same); W. Vaughn, Schools for All: The Blacks and Public Education in the South, 18651877, pp. PICS cites previous Court cases holding that when a means used does not actually address all the harm it purports to address, it cannot be a compelling interest. 76 76. Id., at 73. 36, 7172 (1873)). Invoking our mandatory appellate jurisdiction,[Footnote 7] the Boston plaintiffs prosecuted an appeal in this Court. Few black residents lived outside the central section of the city. 05908, at 7. And the inquiry into less restrictive alternatives demanded by the narrow tailoring analysis requires in many cases a thorough understanding of how a plan works. Id., at 276, 280 (OConnor, J., concurring). 1, 458 U. S. 457, 460 (1982). Brief for Respondent at 3132. No. See Seattle School District, Middle School and High School 2006-2007 Enrollment Guide for Parents, at 40. See Hallinan, Diversity Effects on Student Outcomes: Social Science Evidence, 59 Ohio St. L.J. Ohio adds that a district may object to the enrollment of a native student in an adjacent or other district in order to maintain an appropriate racial balance. 3313.98 (F)(1)(a). 4 See generally Seattle School Dist. in No. See also Freeman, supra, at 495496; Dowell, 498 U. S., at 248; Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U. S. 717, 746 (1974). Governmental classifications that command people to march in different directions based on racial typologies can cause a new divisiveness. And I have found no case that otherwise repudiated this constitutional asymmetry between that which seeks to exclude and that which seeks to include members of minority races. See also ante, at 15 (opinion of Kennedy, J.). Seattle and Louisville are two such districts, and the histories of their present plans set forth typical school integration stories. 491 U.S. 524, 54142 (1989) (Scalia, concurring). Because the school boards lack any further interest in remedying segregation, this element offers no support for the purported interest in integration.. This Court has carved out a narrow exception to that general rule for cases in which a school district has a history of maintaining two sets of schools in a single school system deliberately operated to carry out a governmental policy to separate pupils in schools solely on the basis of race.[Footnote 4] See Swann, 402 U. S., at 56. That is a gamble I am unwilling to take, and it is one the Constitution does not allow. of Boston v. Board of Education, 389 U. S. 572 (1968) (per curiam) (dismissing for want of a federal question a challenge to a voluntary statewide integration plan using express racial criteria). Together with No. Id. of Oral Arg. 7045 and 7291, (WD Ky., June 16, 1978), pp. Prior to Grutter, the courts of appeals rejected as unconstitutional attempts to implement race-based assignment planssuch as the plans at issue herein primary and secondary schools. Each respondent has asserted that its assignment of individual students by race is permissible because there is no other way to avoid racial isolation in the school districts. at 116669. 529, 532 (SC 1951))); Brief for Appellees in Briggs v. Elliott, O.T. 1952, No. As the Court notes, we recognized the compelling nature of the interest in remedying past intentional discrimination in Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U. S. 467, 494 (1992), and of the interest in diversity in higher education in Grutter. Seattle Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. The context here does not involve admission by merit; a childs academic, artistic, and athletic merits are not at all relevant to the childs placement. 05915, 416 F.3d 513, reversed and remanded. Second, Seattle School Dist. However, the question as to whether the constitution requires a local school board, or a State, to act to undo de facto school segregation is simply not here concerned. This case was brought by a non-profit organization, Parents Involved in Community Schools (PICS), representing parents of students in the Seattle School District (District) who objected to the school districts use of race as a tiebreaker for admission to schools as violating the Equal Protection Clause. It would stop this march of progress, this onward sweep). It was about the nature of a democracy that must work for all Americans. of Ed., 102 F.Supp. Here the most Jefferson County itself claims is that because the guidelines provide a firm definition of the Boards goal of racially integrated schools, they provide administrators with the authority to facilitate, negotiate and collaborate with principals and staff to maintain schools within the 1550% range. Brief in Opposition in No. See, e.g., Milliken, 433 U. S., at 280, n.14; Freeman, 503 U. S., at 495496 (Where resegregation is a product not of state action but of private choices, it does not have constitutional implications). Source: G. Orfield & C. Lee, Racial Transformation and the Changing Nature of Segregation 18 (Table 8) (Jan. 2006), (Civil Rights Project), online at http://www.civilrightspro 1 1996 Memorandum 14; Brief for Respondents in No. App. 32, Exh. It argues that it should not be force to walk the tightrope between violating the constitution by failing to integrate schools and violating the constitution by integrating schools. Chief Justice Roberts announced the judgment of the Court, and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, IIIA, and IIIC, and an opinion with respect to Parts IIIB and IV, in which Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito join. 05908, at 276a. See Brief for Respondent at 27. The school board plans before us resemble many others adopted in the last 50 years by primary and secondary schools throughout the Nation. And it is a context in which the school boards plans simply set race-conscious limits at the outer boundaries of a broad range. In the Seattle case, the school district has gone further in describing the methods and criteria used to determine assignment decisions based on individual racial classifications, but it has nevertheless failed to explain why, in a district composed of a diversity of races, with only a minority of the students classified as white, it has employed the crude racial categories of white and non-white as the basis for its assignment decisions. In support, the dissent unquestioningly cites certain social science research to support propositions that are hotly disputed among social scientists. And even if the determination is difficult, it is one the dissent acknowledges must be made to determine what remedies school districts are required to adopt. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 244, 301 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peńa, 515 U. S. 200, 243 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Or is it that a prior federal court had not adjudicated the matter? Banks & C. Banks eds. of Ed., 402 U. S., at 46; Montgomery County Bd. Aside from constitutionally compelled remediation in schools, this Court has permitted government units to remedy prior racial discrimination only in narrow circumstances. Ibid. The plan required that each elementary school in the district maintain 20% to 40% enrollment of African-American students, corresponding to the racial composition of the district. Nineteen of the districts forty-six elementary schools were between 80% and 100% black. The opinions cited by the plurality to justify its reliance upon the de jure/de facto distinction only address what remedial measures a school district may be constitutionally required to undertake. Sometimes a court refers to it as an interest in achieving racial diversity. Other times a court, like the plurality here, refers to it as an interest in racial balancing. I have used more general terms to signify that interest, describing it, for example, as an interest in promoting or preserving greater racial integration of public schools. 05915, at 81. Under that approach, the school districts have not carried their burden of showing that the ends they seek justify the particular extreme means they have chosenclassifying individual students on the basis of their race and discriminating among them on that basis. In concurrence with the majority opinion Justice Clarence Thomas restated his view, in agreement with Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy, that the Constitution is "color-blind." The student assignment plan of Seattle Public Schools and Jefferson County Public Schools does not meet the narrowly tailored and compelling interest requirements for a race-based assignment plan because it is used only to achieve "racial balance." were race-neutral) does not indicate the decline in black achieve- (b)Despite the districts assertion that they employed individual racial classifications in a way necessary to achieve their stated ends, the minimal effect these classifications have on student assignments suggests that other means would be effective. For Seattle, the dissent attempts to make up for this failing by adverting to allegations made in past complaints filed against the Seattle school district. Four basic considerations have led me to this view. The districts point to dicta in a prior opinion in which the Court suggested that, while not constitutionally mandated, it would be constitutionally permissible for a school district to seek racially balanced schools as a matter of educational policy. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. The district, nevertheless, has failed to make an adequate showing in at least one respect. Not even the dissenters thought the race-conscious remedial program posed a constitutional problem. See, e.g., Federal Maritime Commn v. South Carolina Ports Authority, 535 U. S. 743, 770 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting). of Ed., 402 U. S. 1, 6 (1971); see also Monroe v. Board of Commrs of Jackson, 391 U. S. 450, 452 (1968). Regardless of what Justice Breyers goals might be, this Court does not sit to create a society that includes all Americans or to solve the problems of troubled inner city schooling. Ibid. Guided by these principles, the Court concluded: [W]e cannot say that a law which authorizes or even requires the separation of the two races in public conveyances is unreasonable, or more obnoxious to the Fourteenth Amendment than the acts of Congress requiring separate schools for colored children in the District of Columbia. Id., at 550551. The racial breakdown of this nonwhite group is approximately 23.8 percent Asian-American, 23.1 percent African-American, 10.3 percent Latino, and 2.8 percent Native-American. The dissents assertion that these plans are necessary for the school districts to maintain their hard-won gains reveals its conflation of segregation and racial imbalance. [Footnote 3]. The District contends that its plan used the narrowest possible means to achieve is educational goals. Scholars have differing opinions as to whether educational benefits arise from racial balancing. On the other hand race-conscious measures that do not rely on differential treatment based on individual classifications present these problems to a lesser degree. See Part IIB, infra. . Although the Constitution almost always forbids the former, it is significantly more lenient in respect to the latter. When it comes to government race-based decisionmaking, the Constitution demands more. 05908, at 30a. Strict scrutiny is not strict in theory, but fatal in fact. . Parents Involved in Cmty. 1, pp. Justia Annotations is a forum for attorneys to summarize, comment on, and analyze case law published on our site. 2004). (a)As part of its burden of proving that racial classifications are narrowly tailored to further compelling interests, the government must establish, in detail, how decisions based on an individual students race are made in a challenged program. 1922). 69. In 1963, at the insistence of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and other community groups, the school board adopted a new race-based transfer policy. For schools that never segregated on the basis of race, such as Seattle, or that have removed the vestiges of past segregation, such as Jefferson County, the way to achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis, Brown II, 349 U. S., at 300301, is to stop assigning students on a racial basis. In his concurrence, Kennedy differed with the plurality because, he found, the goal of obtaining a diverse student body is a compelling state interest. See supra, at 45. See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U. S. 899, 909910 (1996) ([A]n effort to alleviate the effects of societal discrimination is not a compelling interest); Croson, supra, at 498499; Wygant, 476 U. S., at 276 (plurality opinion) (Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified remedy); id., at 288 (OConnor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ([A] governmental agencys interest in remedying societal discrimination, that is, discrimination not traceable to its own actions, cannot be deemed sufficiently compelling to pass constitutional muster). University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U. S. 390, 393 (1981). See, e.g., Swann, 402 U. S., at 2425; North Carolina Bd. After decades of vibrant life, they would all, under the pluralitys logic, be written out of the law. of Boston, the Illinois Supreme Court had issued an unpublished opinion holding unconstitutional a similar statute aimed at eliminating racial imbalance in public schools. 05908. The Seattle Board Statement Reaffirming Diversity Rationale speaks of the inherent educational value in [p]roviding students the opportunity to attend schools with diverse student enrollment, App. Our Nation from the inception has sought to preserve and expand the promise of liberty and equality on which it was founded. 05-908, at 38a-39a, 45a. Consequently I must conclude that the plans here are permitted under the Constitution. See, e.g., Brief for Appellants in Brown v. Board of Education, O.T. 1953, Nos. While the school districts use various verbal formulations to describe the interest they seek to promoteracial diversity, avoidance of racial isolation, racial integrationthey offer no definition suggesting that their interest differs from racial balancing. The District has not met its burden of proving these marginal changes outweigh the cost of subjecting hundreds of students to disparate treatment based solely upon the color of their skin. 377 F.3d, at 984985 (footnote omitted). Under no fair reading, though, can the majority opinion in Gratz be cited as authority to sustain the racial classifications under consideration here. What does the plurality say in response? This entire contention is tantamount to saying that the vindication and enjoyment of constitutional rights recognized by this Court as present and personal can be postponed whenever such postponement is claimed to be socially desirable). [Footnote 11]. Choice, therefore, is the predominant factor in these plans. of Ed., 476 U. S. 267, 277 (1986) (plurality opinion). One schoolGarfieldis more or less in the center of Seattle. The boards work in communities where demographic patterns change, where they must meet traditional learning goals, where they must attract and retain effective teachers, where they should (and will) take account of parents views and maintain their commitment to public school education, where they must adapt to court intervention, where they must encourage voluntary student and parent actionwhere they will find that their own good faith, their knowledge, and their understanding of local circumstances are always necessary but often insufficient to solve the problems at hand. Croson, 488 U. S., at 504. 1996); see also T. Sowell, Affirmative Action Around the World: An Empirical Study 141165 (2004). To Crawford? 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